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Abstract 
Examples of religion’s recent political impact abound in states at varying levels of economic 
and political development. The paper examines the relationship between religion and politics 
over the last quarter century in a variety of countries; in effect, a global survey. What was new 
and became ‘news’ in the 1980s was the widespread and simultaneous refusal of the so-called 
‘world religions’ - Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism - to restrict them selves to the 
private sphere. Religious organizations of various kinds seem openly to be rejecting the secular 
ideals dominating most national policies, appearing as champions of alternative, confessional 
options. In keeping faith with what they interpret as divine decree, increasingly they refuse to 
render to nonreligious power either material or moral tribute. They are also refusing to restrict 
themselves to the pastoral care of individual souls, instead raising questions about, inter alia, 
the interconnections of private and public morality and the claims of states and markets to be 
exempt from extrinsic normative considerations. 
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A. Introduction 
Around the world religious organizations are openly rejecting the secular 
ideals that dominate most national policies, appearing as champions of alternative, 
confessional options. In keeping faith with what they interpret as divine decree, 
increasingly they refuse to render to nonreligious power either material or moral 
tribute. They are increasingly concerned with political issues, challenging the 
legitimacy and autonomy of the primary secular spheres, the state, political 
organization and the market economy. They are also refusing to restrict 
themselves to the pastoral care of individual souls, instead raising questions about, 
inter alia, the interconnections of private and public morality and the claims of 
states and markets to be exempt from extrinsic normative considerations. Intent on 
retaining social importance, many religious organizations seek to elude what they 
regard as the cumbersome constraints of temporal authority, threatening to usurp 
constituted political functions. In short, refusing to be condemned to the realm of 
privatize belief, religion is once again appearing in the public sphere, thrusting into 
issues of moral and political contestation.  
My argument is that, around the world, religion is leaving, or refusing to 
accept, its assigned place in the private sphere. This is true, I believe, even in highly 
secular societies like that of England where mainline Christian churches have 
recently re-emerged as important social, moral and - to a degree - political voices. 
There, building on a tradition established during the premiership of Margaret 
Thatcher in the 1970s, the publication in October 1996 of the Catholic Church’s 
13,000-word pamphlet, The Common Good and the Catholic Church’s Social Teaching, 
was an important intervention in the political debate between the Labour and 
Conservative parties.  Politicians - especially of the latter party - saw it as an 
endorsement of Labour’s policies. Six months later - in April 1997 - 11 churches 
collectively published a further report entitled, Unemployment and the Future of 
Work, an outspoken attack on the inability of the main parties in Britain to focus 
upon the amelioration of the suffering of the underprivileged. The report accused 
them of putting tax cuts before solutions to poverty and unemployment in the 
battle for victory in the May 1997 general election (Bellos & White 1997).  
Concerned with overtly political issues, The Common Good and 
Unemployment and the Future of Work were both manifestations of the 
contemporary process of repolitization of the increasingly private religious and 
moral spheres in England. The reports represented an attempt to reestablish 
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ethical norms of behavior and activities in public and political spheres and to 
present a political case for so doing. In the publications, mainline churches 
endorsed what were clearly political goals, expressing opposition to the 
dualism between religion and politics, and arguing that the concerns of social 
justice were, in fact, not only scripturally rooted, but also wedded to the 
defense of liberal democracy, pluralism and the market economy (Watson, 
1994: 149; Huntington, 1991, 1993). In short, the central issue for the churches 
was the degree to which the consumerist version of politics should be modified 
or balanced by the social dimension (Edwards, 1990; Glasman, 1996). 
However, it is not only churches in England that are concerned with 
social, economic and political issues. Globally, numerous religious organizations 
and institutions share a desire to change their societies in a religious direction. In 
pursuit of this objective, they use a variety of tactics and methods some, like the 
British churches, lobby, protest and publish reports at the level of civil society; 
others   seek desired changes via political society - for example, the American 
New Christian Right regularly endorses electoral candidates with the most ‘pro-
religion’ (or ‘pro-life’) policies; a few - Islamists in Algeria and Egypt - regularly 
resort to violence and terrorism to achieve their goals. However, from the 
perspective of academic inquiry the means to achieve goals are perhaps less 
important than the ends pursued whatever the chosen modes of political 
interaction, what  is new and unexpected in all this  is the  re-modeling  and  re-
assumption of public roles by religion which  theories of secularization  had long 
condemned  to  social and political marginalization.   
What is happening in the sphere of religion and politics, on the one 
hand, involves widespread, if patchy, ‘deprivatization’ of previously privatized 
religions in the Western world, where there is a more or less clear tripartite 
division of democratic polities into state, political society, and civil society; 
according to conventional social science wisdom such an arrangement should - 
inevitably - lead to religion’s privatization and corresponding decline in social 
and political importance. On the other hand, where the process of religious 
privatization is not so far advanced - that is, in nearly all Third World countries - 
it is the fear of imminent or creeping privatization which provides the main 
stimulus for religion to act politically. 
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B. Explaining Religious Deprivatization 
To understand the political importance of religious actors, we need to 
comprehend what they say and do in their relationship with the state. Following 
Stepan (1988 3), I mean something more than ‘mere’ government when referring 
to the state it is the continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic, and coercive 
system that attempts not only to manage the state apparatus but in addition to 
‘structure relations between civil and public power and to structure many crucial 
relationships within civil and political society’. Almost everywhere, states seek to 
reduce religion’s political influence - that is, they seek to privatize it, significantly to 
reduce its political importance. In countries at differing levels of economic 
development - for example, the USA, Nigeria, Tanzania, Indonesia, Israel, Burma 
and Poland - states attempt to erect civil religions, that is, where certain designated 
religious formats ‘function as the cult of the political community’ (Casanova 1994: 
58). The purpose is to create forms of consensual, corporate religion, claiming to be 
guided by general, culturally appropriate, societally-specific religious beliefs, not 
necessarily tied institutionally to any specific religious tradition (Hallencreutz & 
Westerlund 1996; Liebman & Eliezer 1983). The main point is that the 
development of civil religion is a strategy to avoid social conflicts and promote 
national coordination, especially in countries with serious religious or ideological 
divisions. However, civil religions are often perceived by minority religious 
persuasions to be aimed at installing and perpetuate the hegemony of one 
religious tradition at the expense of others.  
But religion’s relationship with the state is not only bounded by attempts 
to build civil religions - it is of greater public salience in a wide range of state-
religion relationships. That relations between religious organizations and the 
state have become more visible and often increasingly problematic in many 
countries in recent years does not, of course, constitute in itself evidence against 
the idea that states in the contemporary era do not need the kind of religious 
legitimating exemplified by civil religion. One certainly has, for example, to 
entertain the possibility that the recent proliferation of religious-based challenges 
to the authority of the state is merely transitory reactions to the onward march of 
secularization. Moreover, even if - as some significant figures in social science 
have claimed - the modern state is particularly vulnerable to legitimating crises, 
that does not in itself mean that religion is becoming again automatically relevant 
 Religion in Global Politics: Explaining Deprivatization 
Jeff Haynes 
JIP-International Multidisciplinary Journal {203 
to the functioning of the state machinery. Normally, religion-based challenges 
have their roots in endeavors by the state to assert a monitoring role vis-à-vis 
religion, in effect to control it. 
Traditionally, problems of church-state interaction are found in various 
Western contexts. However, expanding the problem of church-state relations to 
non-Christian contexts necessitates some preliminary conceptual clarifications - 
not least because the very idea of a prevailing state-church dichotomy is culture-
bound. Church is a Christian institution, while the modern understanding of state is 
deeply rooted in the Post-Reformation European political experience. In their 
specific cultural setting and social significance, the tension and the debate over the 
church-state relationship are uniquely Western phenomena, present in the 
ambivalent dialectic of ‘render therefore unto Caesar the things which be Caesar’s 
and unto God the things which be God’s (Luke, 21-25). Overloaded with Western 
cultural history, these two concepts cannot easily be translated into non-Christian 
terminologies. Some religions - for example, Hinduism - have no ecclesiastical 
structure at all. Consequently, there cannot be a clerical challenge to India’s secular 
state comparable to that of Buddhist monks in South East Asia or Shiite mullahs in 
Iran. However, political parties and movements energized by religious notions - 
especially Hinduism and Sikhism - are of great importance in contemporary India. 
Regarding Third World regions, only in Latin America is it pertinent to 
speak of church-state relations along the lines of the European model. This is so 
because of the historical regional dominance of the Roman Catholic Church and 
the creation of European-style states in the early nineteenth century. But the 
traditional European-centric Christian conceptual framework of church-state 
relations  appears alien within and with respect to nearly all African and Asian 
societies - whether predominantly Christian, Islamic, Buddhist or Hindu - or 
involving religious mixes of various kinds.  
The differences between Christian conceptions of state and church and 
those of other world religions are well illustrated by reference to Islam. In the 
Muslim tradition, mosque is not church. The closest Islamic approximation to 
‘state’ - dawla - means, as a concept, either a ruler’s dynasty or his administration 
(Vatikiotis, 1987: 36). Only with the specific Durkheimian stipulation of church as 
the generic concept for moral community, priest for the custodians of the sacred law, 
and state for political community can we comfortably use these concepts in Islamic 
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and other non-Christian contexts. On the theological level, the command-
obedience nexus that constitutes the Islamic definition of authority is not 
demarcated by conceptual categories of religion and politics. Life as a physical 
reality is an expression of divine will and authority (qudrah’). There is no validity in 
separating the matters of piety from those of the polity; both are divinely ordained. 
Yet, although both religious and political authorities are legitimated Islamically, 
they invariably constitute two independent social institutions. They do, however, 
regularly interact with each other (Dabashi, 1987: 183). 
Once many believed it axiomatic that modernization would lead to 
religious privatization and, ineluctably, to secularization. In other words, it was 
believed inevitable that a global decline was occurring in religion’s social and 
political importance. But the 1979 revolution in Iran burst onto the scene, 
suggesting not only that there was more than one interpretation of modernization 
but also that it could be that religion plays a leading role. Since then, religion in 
politics seems to be everywhere. Three questions are central in seeking to account 
for religion’s current impact on politics. First, why should religious organizations 
become political actors? I contend that this normally occurs when religion feels 
under serious threat from secular policies. Second, how widespread is the 
phenomenon? My starting assumption is that it is widespread, although case by 
case study would be necessary to verify or falsify this conjecture. Third, what are 
the political consequences of religion’s intervention? The short answer is they are 
variable. Sometimes religion appears to have a pivotal influence on political 
outcomes - for example, the role of the Catholic church in the return to democracy 
in Latin America and Eastern Europe in the 1980s - while elsewhere - for example, 
in the attempts by Algerian Islamists to force the government to stand down 
despite a civil war costing a reported 60,000 lives - it seems unable to influence 
political outcomes definitively, at least in the short term.  
For analytical convenience I will divide the world into two parts, the West 
and the Third World, with Eastern Europe - the former Second World - treated as 
part of the former because of state-imposed secularization over decades during the 
communist era.  
 
1. The West 
Two phenomena are simultaneously taking place in the West: a) there is 
an increase in various forms of spirituality and religiosity; b) leading churches 
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are articulating viewpoints on political and social issues more readily and openly 
than in the past. I have already suggested that the latter phenomenon is because 
many churches are no longer willing to be sidelined as states’ jurisdictions 
expand into areas previously under their control. But are people becoming 
personally more religious while their societies are becoming collectively more 
secular? Three main arguments have been offered in this regard; a) religion takes 
the place of secular ideologies which no longer have wide appeal; b) religion 
becomes popular on a cyclical basis; c) religion, expressed in new religious 
movements, emerges in response to the impact of modernity and/or post 
modernity. Let us look at each argument.  
First, people are believed to be turning to religion in the West in response 
to a decline in the attraction of secular ideologies, especially communism and 
socialism people need something to believe in, and religion fits the bill,  especially in 
the context of the ‘New World Disorder’ of the 1990s (Jowitt 1993). During this 
period of uncertainty, many people are thought to be rediscovering the religious 
dimension to group identity. Religiously pluralistic Societies - especially the USA - 
have increased emphasis on religion as a basis of group identity which is, it is 
argued, politically destabilizing. The main problem with this explanation is that 
religion has not returned only in the 1990s. Rather, in some countries - the USA is 
the archetypal example - political religion has been a feature since the 1960s with a 
decline of the influence of civil religion. 
Second, we are also said to be witnessing what is merely a cyclical 
phenomenon periodically there is a collective ‘thirst’ for religion (Martin, 1994). 
Shupe (1990: 20) argues that religion has been a significant factor in a number of 
political mass movements in the West over the last 30 years, including ‘the 
American civil rights movement, the Northern Ireland struggle of independence 
… and the Moral Majority in the United States’. The conclusion he draws is that 
this-worldly answers to the meaning and purpose of life periodically appear 
alienating and unsatisfying to many people as a result, religious beliefs 
periodically find fresh relevance and power, perhaps within new structures and 
patterns of belief.  Yet what needs to be explained it why should religion enjoy a 
periodic resurgence? What set of factors needs to be in operation to trigger this 
development? This is not satisfactorily answered by the proponents of the 
cyclical theory of religious resurgence. 
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Third, it is suggested that statistics indicate that people are becoming ‘more’ 
religious in the West, rather than less secularization is being reversed. The argument 
hinges partly on surveys purportedly showing growing attendance at religious 
services and more religious book buying (Duke and Johnson, 1989; Martin, 1994). It 
is also dependent on the large numbers of new religious movements emerging, 
including the fast-growing ‘charismatic’ Christian phenomenon, unattached to any 
strong doctrinal tradition. Charismatic are Christians who believe in the ‘power of 
present manifestations of the Holy Spirit but, unlike Pentecost lists, choose to remain 
in mainline congregations’ (Coleman 1996 30). Charismatic Christianity is a 
widespread non-denominational tendency based on a belief in the divinely-inspired 
gifts of speaking in tongues, healing, prophecy, and so on, offering devotee’s 
spiritual excitement. Charismatic are often thought to eschew politics because 
religion and politics should be kept separate. 
There are many other new religious and spiritual phenomena in the 
West - including various manifestations of what is known as ‘New Age’ 
spirituality; various  ‘exotic’ Eastern religions like the Hare Krishna cult; 
‘televangelism’; renewed interest in astrology, and new sects like the 
Scientologists. Yet, such religious groups, Casanova (1994: 5) points out, are ‘not 
particularly relevant for the social sciences or for the self-understanding of 
modernity’, because they do not present ‘major problems of interpretation … 
They fit within expectations and can be interpreted within the framework of 
established theories of secularization’. The point is that they are normal 
phenomena, examples of neither private religion which do not challenge - nor 
wish to - the dominant political a social structures.  Such religious phenomenon 
are very often apolitical; ‘all’ they really show is that many people are interested 
in spiritual issues. Yet, in many Western Catholic countries - for example, Italy 
and Spain - the Church   has lost much of its moral appeal for many people, 
especially the young (Hooper 1996). In sum, it is correct to stress that the 
multiplicity of extant religious phenomena belie any popular loss of interest in 
religious meaning - even in apparently highly secular countries - and that 
innovative religious forms are gaining ground, often at the expense of traditional 
religions. But from a political perspective new religions are not of importance.   
To assess religion’s socio-political role in the West it is necessary to 
separate two linked - yet analytically autonomous - phenomena, which are often 
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unwarrantedly conflated. First, as already noted, there is said to be a widespread 
revival of religious belief in the West.  Woollacott (1995) writes that ‘anybody who 
had prophesied 30 years ago that the 20th century would end with a resurgence of 
religion, with great new cathedrals, mosques, and temples rising up, with the 
symbols and songs of faith everywhere apparent, would, in most circles, have 
been derided’. Second, many religious organizations in the West are involving 
themselves in political, social and moral questions to a considerable   degree. These 
two developments may well be connected but they are not the same thing. Woollacott 
says nothing about the political impact of perceived religious resurgence, nor what 
has caused it. Given that one of the areas in the throes of an apparent religious 
revival - Eastern Europe - is a region where religion was, until recently, strongly 
controlled by the state, it is not that surprising that once restraints are withdrawn 
then it will assume a higher profile. But does this mean that religion then necessarily 
assumes a higher political profile, just because there are more openly religious 
people than before? My tentative answer is no. For example, the Russian Orthodox 
Church has failed to involve itself extensively in political controversies despite a 
popular shift to religion in the post-communist era. In other words, Russian society 
may now be highly religious at the level of individual belief, but this has not led to 
an institutionalized political role for the Orthodox Church - probably because the 
Church cannot easily shake of the behavior of the last 80 years.  
The point is that Russia was a highly secular society during the 
communist era. More generally, it has long been believed that as society 
modernizes it secularizes - that is, it becomes more complex with a division of 
labour emerging whereby institutions become more highly specialized and 
increasingly in need of their own technicians. When this happens, religious 
agencies - once concerned with a variety of activities including heath delivery, 
government and the interplay of gender relations - are forced, like the Russian 
Orthodox Church during communism, to withdraw to the core area of expertise 
the spiritual realm. The end result of secularization is of course a secular society 
that is, where the pursuit of politics takes place irrespective of predominant 
religious interests.  
Secularization has been one of the main social and political trends in 
Western Europe since the Enlightenment (1720-80). A quarter century ago Smith 
(1970: 6) - following  such senior figures of nineteenth century social science as 
Marx, Durkheim, Weber - declared secularization ‘the most fundamental 
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structural and ideological change in the process of political development’,  a global 
trend, a universal  facet of modernization. As Shupe (1990: 19) puts it, the 
‘demystification of religion inherent in the classic secularization paradigm posited 
a gradual, persistent, unbroken erosion of religious influence’ as societies 
modernized.  
The existence of a stubbornly significant role for religion in two 
Western environments - the USA and Northern Ireland - cast doubt on the 
secularization thesis.  Additionally, while most Western countries are to a 
large degree secularized in some churches are involving themselves in 
political controversies in a manner unthinkable 20 or 30 years ago. The 
point is that ‘when religion finds or retains work to do other than relating 
people to the supernatural’ it is likely to have a public voice and a concern 
with socio-political issues (Bruce 1993 51). I posit that only when religion 
does something other than intercede between the individual and God 
does it keep a high place in people’s attentions and in their politics in 
otherwise highly secular societies.  
Both Northern Ireland and the USA fit the bill in this regard. In the 
former, religion is an integral component of local communities’ strategies of 
cultural defense.  When ‘culture, identity, and a sense of worth are challenged by a 
source promoting either an alien religion or rampant secularism and that source 
is negatively valued’ then religion will serve as an important facet of group 
solidarity (Wallis and Bruce, 1992: 17-18). In Northern Ireland, religion furnishes 
resources for asserting a group’s claim to a sense of worth, where differing 
religious interpretations not only form the basis of group identity but also 
amount to an ideology of defense from encroachment from the feared ‘other’. 
Both sets of believers - Catholics and Protestants  - believe that the other lot is out 
to crush them and their religious (and ethnic) identity - hence, the retention of  
religion helps not only to bolster one’s personal sense of identity but also helps to  
maintains a strong collective ethos against outside attack. 
In the USA, religion has a continuing high social and political profile 
because it helps those engaged in the prolonged process of cultural transition. 
Cultural transition refers to the notion that when a religious group’s identity is 
threatened by modernization it will turn to its theology to furnish the means to 
fight back, serving as an ideology of group solidarity (Wallis and Bruce, 1992; 
 Religion in Global Politics: Explaining Deprivatization 
Jeff Haynes 
JIP-International Multidisciplinary Journal {209 
Walker 1996; Abramsky, 1996).  Fundamentalist Christians - an important feature 
of the political scene in the USA over the last 25 years - exhibit the desire to stop the 
encroachment of secularization, perceived as the work of the Devil. The overall 
point is that in both the USA and Northern Ireland religion furnishes the resources 
either for dealing with the effects of modernization and cultural transitions or for 
asserting a group’s claim to a sense of worth during times of profound social 
change. 
 
2. The Third World 
Surveys indicate that most people in nearly all Third World countries are 
religious believers (Duke and Johnson 1989). Some argue that there is 
widespread growth of religious movements with political goals in the Third 
World which emerged in the 1980s (Thomas, 1995; Casanova, 1994). Many are 
grassroots movements led or coordinated by middle- or low-ranking religious 
professionals. Sometimes, as in Guatemala, the perceived secularization of the 
Catholic Church ‘seems to bear a direct and inverse correlation to the strength of 
popular religious movements and organizations, especially in indigenous 
sectors’ (Garrard-Burnett, 1996: 98).  
Why should there be an increase in numbers of Third World religious 
groups with political goals? Sahliyeh (1990: 15) maintains that social upheaval 
and economic dislocation connected to the processes of modernization have sent 
people back to religion in the Third World. Miles (1996: 525) argues that in the 
1990s, a period of social, economic and political transition in many countries, 
‘populations throughout the developing world … are rediscovering the religious 
dimension to group identity and statist politics’ (emphasis added in both). 
Sahliyeh and Miles are claiming  that there has been a ‘return’ to religion in the 
Third World, the consequence of inconclusive or unsatisfactory modernization, 
disillusionment with secular nationalism, problems of state legitimacy, political 
oppression and incomplete national identity, widespread socioeconomic 
grievances, and the perceived erosion of traditional morality and values. The 
simultaneity of these crises is said to provide a fertile milieu for the growth of 
political religion.  
I do not doubt that such factors provide an enabling environment for 
religion’s political prominence in the Third World. I am equally sure that 
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unwelcome developments prod many people to look to religion to provide 
answers to existential angst. But religion has always fulfilled such a role; it is 
highly unlikely that there is ‘more’ religion now than in the past in the Third 
World. Why then do religious groups with political goals seem more common? 
It is possible that they are simply more visible due to the global 
communications revolution; there are not more of them, just that we can see 
them - and their consequences - more easily.  Smith (1990: 34) claims that ‘what 
has changed in the present situation… is mainly the growing awareness of’ 
manifestations of political religion in the Third World ‘by the Western world, 
and the perception that they might be related to our interests’.  
It is important to understand there are numerous historical examples of 
political religion in the Third World, especially during Western colonization and 
after it. In the colonial era, Western powers sought to introduce secularism in 
many cases resulting in a religious backlash. ‘Non-western’ religions, such as 
Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam had periods of intense political activity (Smith, 
1990: 34; Haynes 1993, 1995, 1996). In the years immediately after World War I, 
religion was widely employed in the service of anti-colonial nationalism in 
Africa, Asia and the Middle East (Engels & Marks, 1994; Furedi 1994; Haynes 
1993, 1995, 1996). After World War II, in 1947, Pakistan was founded as a Muslim 
state, religiously and culturally distinct from Hindu-dominated India, while 
Buddhism was of great political importance in Burma and Vietnam in the 
struggle for liberation from colonial rule. During the 1960s in Latin America, 
Christian democracy and liberation theology were of widespread political 
significance. In the 1970s and 1980s, political religion was of great importance in 
the varying contexts of Iran and Nicaragua. What this all points to is that political 
religion in the Third World has a long history of opposition to unacceptably 
secular regimes; it is not ab initio in the contemporary period, but rather  should 
be see as a series of historical responses to attempts by the state to reduce 
religion’s political influence.  
In the immediate aftermath of independence after World War II, Third 
World modernizing politicians, influenced by Western ideologies, often Western-
educated, and impressed by Western countries’ order and progress, filled the void 
left by colonial administrators. However, the secularization process promoted by 
nationalist leaders did not, for the most part, bring development. Instead, 
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secularization resulted in the attempted transplantation of alien Western 
institutions, laws, and procedures which aimed to erode, undermine and 
eventually displace traditional and holistic religio-political systems. The putative 
modernizers saw their countries as politically, socially and economically backward 
what was needed was to emulate the secular model of progress pursued so 
successfully by Western countries. Consequently, political modernizers sought to 
enforce policies and programmer of modernization - which also, to them, meant 
secularization. However, within a few years, the credibility and legitimacy of 
‘secular socialism, secular capitalism, or a mixture of both’ (Husain, 1995: 161) was 
often seriously undermined, as they widely failed to deliver on promises of 
economic development and national integration.  
Poorly implemented modernization programmer also proved 
incompatible with traditional religious practices, as growing numbers of people 
left the rural areas for urban locales because of land and employment shortages. 
While the social, political and economic impact of displacement and urban 
migration is extensive and complex, it seems highly likely that dislocation of large 
numbers of people from local communities, and the reforging of personal relations 
in urban areas, ‘opened the way to renegotiation of allegiances to traditional 
institutions’ (Garrard-Burnett, 1996: 102). Where modernization was particularly 
aggressively pursued - in, for example, India, Thailand, Egypt, Algeria, Brazil - 
religious backlashes occurred, in protest at unpopular state policies.  
In summary, post-colonial governments in the Third World often 
followed policies of nation-building and expansion of state power, equating 
secularization with modernization. However, by undermining traditional 
value systems, often allocating opportunities in highly unequal ways, 
modernization produced in many ordinary people a deep sense of alienation, 
stimulating a search for an identity that would give life some purpose and 
meaning. Many believed they might deal with the unwelcome effects of 
modernization if they presented their claims for more of the ‘national cake’ as 
part of a group. Often the sense of collectivity was rooted in the epitome of 
traditional community religion. The result was a focus on religiosity, with far-
reaching implications for social integration and political stability. This is not a 
‘return’ to religion, but the utilization of religious belief to help pursue the 
pursuit of social, political and economic goals.  
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Clearly, for religion to be useful as a defense against secularization, it 
must be able to focus and coordinate popular dissatisfaction. There must be what 
Bellah (1965: 194) calls a ‘creative tension between religious ideals and the world’ 
where ‘transcendent ideals, in tension with empirical reality, have a central place 
in the religious symbol system, while empirical reality itself is taken very 
seriously as at least potentially meaningful, valuable, and a valid sphere for 
religious action’. This is a way of saying that when the secular world seeks to 
impose on religion’s space, at a certain somewhat variable stage it will fight back, 
aiming to reduce secular influence and to regain its autonomy.  
Fighting back against encroaching secularization   explains the strong 
profile of political religion in the Third World. For example, the radicalism of 
Catholic priests and liberation theology in Latin America, the growth of 
Islamism in the Middle East and of Sikh separatism in India, are all explicable 
in this way. Smith (1990 33) claims that overt links between such phenomena 
are ‘weak or nonexistent. Liberation theologians and revolutionary ayatollahs 
may be aware of each other’s existence but have not influenced each other 
very much’.  What he means by this, I take it, is that empirical evidence of 
direct, personal relationships is absent. But this is not the point  virtually all 
post-colonial Third World countries share  the historical desire of  political 
elites to secularize, to modernize, to ‘improve’ their ‘backward’ societies. In 
my view, we do not need to look further for ‘causes’ of political religion in 
the Third World it is a common response from those who value their 
religious milieu and who do not wish to see it undermined by the advance of 
secularized ‘progress’. If people of different religious backgrounds employ 
broadly similar tactics it does not mean they have had to learn from each 
other only that they collectively respond in similar ways.  
Third World states seek to prevent, or at the least make it very 
difficult for, political religion to organize. In most Muslim countries, for 
example, Islamist parties are either proscribed or, at least, infiltrated by state 
security services. Algeria’s Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), the Islamic 
Tendency Movement of Tunisia, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine, the 
Islamic Party of Kenya, and Tanzania’s Balukta were all banned in the early 
1990s. Others - including the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan of Indonesia, the 
Parti Islam Se Malaysia and Egypt’s Muslim Brothers - are controlled or 
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infiltrated by the state. On the rare occasions when Islamist parties are 
allowed openly to seek electoral support they are often successful. Examples 
include the FIS electoral victories in 1990/1 and that of Turkey’s Welfare 
Party (Refah Partisi). The latter won the largest share of the vote (21 per cent) 
of any party in the 1995 election. Later, in 1996, Refah achieved power in 
coalition with a right-wing secular party, the True Path.  Parties like the FIS 
and Refah are electoral popular because offer the disaffected, the alienated 
and the poverty-stricken a vehicle to pursue beneficial change. 
On the other hand, in India, there is strong electoral support for Hindu 
nationalist parties - and not only from the poor and marginalized.  Shiv Sena 
jointly rules Bombay and Maharashtra state with the Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP). Nationally, the BJP has emerged as the largest political party in India, 
eclipsing the country’s traditionally dominant Congress (I) Party. In Buddhist 
Thailand, on the other hand, a Buddhist reformist party, Santi Asoke, had some 
electoral success in the early 1990s. The point is that parties like Shiv Sena, the 
BJP and Santi Asoke all have a wide appeal as viable alternatives to ruling 
parties often characterized as both corrupt and inefficient. In sum, when Third 
World people lose faith in the transformatory abilities of secular politicians, 
religion often appears a viable alternative for the pursuit of beneficial change. It 
has widely reemerged into the public arena as a mobilizing   normative force. 
 
C. Conclusion 
My main argument is that the political impact of religion will fall into two 
main - not necessarily mutually exclusive - categories. First, if the mass of people 
are not especially religious organized religion will often seek a public role as a 
result of the belief that society has taken a wrong turn - and needs an injection of 
religious values to put it back on the straight and narrow. Religion will try to 
deprivatize itself, so that it has a voice in contemporary debates about social and 
political direction. The aim is to be a significant factor in political deliberations so 
that religion’s voice is taken into account. Religious leaders  seeks  support from 
ordinary people by addressing certain crucial issues, including not only the 
perceived decline in public and private morality but also the  insecurities of life in 
an undependable market where ‘greed and luck appear as effective as work and 
rational choice’ (Comaroff 1994 310). In sum, in the West religion’s return to the 
public sphere is moulded by a range of factors, including the proportion of 
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religious believers in society and the extent to which religious organizations 
perceive a decline in public standards of morality and compassion. 
In Third World societies, on the other hand, most people are already 
religious believers. Following widespread   disappointment at the outcomes of 
modernizing policies, however, religion often focuses and coordinates opposition, 
especially - but not exclusively - the poor and ethnic minorities. Attempts by 
political leaders to pursue modernization lead religious traditions to respond. 
What this amounts to is that in the Third World in particular religion is often well 
placed to benefit from any strong societal backlash against the perceived malign 
effects of modernization. 
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